INTRODUCTION
In many marriages, especially in Nigeria, it is not uncommon for a property acquired during the subsistence of the union to be registered solely in the name of one spouse, even when both parties contributed to its acquisition or improvement. This situation raises a fundamental legal question: Who truly owns the property? The name of the person who appears on the title documents or the one whose contribution made its acquisition possible? The determination of proprietary rights between spouses in Nigeria remains largely a judicial construct. There is an absence of a comprehensive statutory framework regulating matrimonial property, and the Nigerian courts have resorted to equitable doctrines, most prominently resulting trust, for resolving disputes arising from this. The Matrimonial Causes Act is primarily concerned with the dissolution of marriages and ancillary reliefs, and provides no coherent guidance on ownership or division of matrimonial property.[1] This legislative gap has necessitated the judicial reliance on equitable doctrines developed years ago and received into the Nigerian law.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Jolugbo v. Aina & Anor. (SC)[2] presents a positive and remarkable reaffirmation of equity’s balancing role in property ownership within marriages. In that case, property registered in the husband’s name was shown to have been purchased with funds provided by the wife, and the court was required to determine the true beneficial owner. The Supreme Court, affirming the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeal, held that a resulting trust existed in favour of the wife, and that the purported transfer of the property to a third party was accordingly invalid. In resolving such disputes, courts frequently rely on the doctrine of Resulting Trust, Constructive Trust and the Presumption of Advancement to prevent unjust enrichment, and to ensure that beneficial ownership corresponds with contribution and intention.
This article undertakes a critical review of that decision against the background of relevant Nigerian and comparative jurisprudence, with a view to accessing whether the resulting trust remains an adequate instrument for the equitable resolution of matrimonial property claims in contemporary Nigeria.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND ITS LIMITS IN MARITAL PROPERTY
Documentary evidence is the strongest indication of ownership in property law. Title deeds, registered conveyances, and other formal instruments typically provide prima facie evidence of legal ownership, which shows that the person whose name appears on the document holds ownership rights. However, in the context of marriages, such documents fail to capture the full spectrum of contributions, financial and non-financial contributions made toward the acquisition, improvement, or maintenance of the property. It is a social and cultural reality in Nigeria that property acquired by couples is commonly registered in the husband’s name alone, regardless of the wife’s contribution to its purchase. This practice may arise from patriarchal convention, from administrative convenience, or simply from a lack of legal awareness. Whatever the reason, its legal consequences can be severe: a wife who contributed the entirety of the purchase price for a property but whose name appears nowhere in the title documents may find herself unable to assert any claim to that property in the event of a dispute. As the Supreme Court held in Ughutevbe v. Shonowo & Anor,[3] the general proposition is that, where, on a purchase, property is conveyed in the name of someone other than the purchaser, the presumption is that the trust of the legal estate results to the man who advances the purchase money. This principle, which has its origins in the English decision of Dyer v. Dyer[4] establishes that the documentary title is not the final proof of beneficial ownership. Where the evidence shows that the purchase money was provided by someone other than the person named in the title, equity will give effect to that reality by raising a resulting trust.
The limits of documentary evidence in the matrimonial context were sharply illustrated in Jolugbo v. Aina.[5] The 1st Respondent, Mrs O.A. Aina, held no document of title whatsoever. All the documents of title bore the name of her husband, the late Mr Olayinka Aina. Yet she succeeded at the trial court, at the Court of Appeal, and ultimately at the Supreme Court, on the strength of evidence that it was she who provided the funds for the acquisition of the property and who serviced the mortgage instalments throughout. The case demonstrates with clarity that, in equity, contribution speaks louder than documentation.
THE DOCTRINE OF RESULTING TRUST IN MARITAL PROPERTY
The law of equity is a set of legal principles that seek to provide fair and just outcomes in situations where the strict application of the law may lead to injustice. Equity is founded on fundamental principles of fairness, justice, inclusion, accessibility, responsiveness, and empowerment. The concept of trusteeship was defined by the Supreme Court in the case of Ibekwe v. Nwosu[6] per John Afolabi Fabiyi, JSC thus:
“Trust, simpliciter, is the right enforceable solely in equity to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title. It is a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it must involve specific property. Certainty of subject matter is an important element in trust. It should reflect the settlor’s intent and be created for a lawful purpose.”
The elements of trust were restated by the Supreme Court in the case of Huebner v. Aeronautical Industrial Engineering & Project Management Co. Ltd[7] per Paul Adamu Galumje, JSC thus: “Trust involves three elements, namely: A trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of another; A beneficiary to whom the trustee owes equitable duties to deal with the trust property for his benefit and Trust property, which is held by the trustee for the beneficiary.”[8]
In the landscape of Nigerian property jurisprudence, few equitable doctrines have generated complex interpretations, such as the doctrine of Resulting Trust and the Presumption of Advancement. Both principles have been woven into the jurisprudence of the Nigerian Legal system through judicial decisions spanning decades. These doctrines embody the general agenda of equity, which is to ensure that ownership and beneficial interest do not rest on technicalities but on conscience and on fairness.[9]
A resulting trust arises whenever legal or equitable title to property is in the name of one party, where that party, because he is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property, is under an obligation to return it to the true owner, or to the person who gave value for it.[10] The general justification for this is that people do not intend to make gifts unless there is clear evidence of such intention. Thus, if A pays for B’s property, it is assumed that A did not intend to gift the property to B, but intends that B is holding it in trust for A. Therefore, the beneficial interest remains with A, except there is evidence which proves the contrary. As the Supreme Court held in Madu v. Madu,[11] the doctrine of resulting trust is based upon the unexpressed but presumed intention of the true owner who provided the consideration for the purchase of such property.
In Re Vandervell’s Trust (No. 2) [1974],[12] resulting trusts were authoritatively classified into two categories: “presumed” and “automatic” resulting trusts. This classification has been adopted by the Nigerian Courts.
A presumed resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances. The first circumstance will arise in a situation where A makes a voluntary payment to B, or pays wholly or in part for the purchase of property vested either in B alone or jointly in A and B; there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B. The money or property is held on trust for A (if A was the sole provider) or, in the case of a joint purchase by A and B, in shares proportionate to their respective contributions. Second, where A transferred property to B on express trust, but the trust declared does not exhaust the entire beneficial interest, the undisposed portion results back to A.
An automatic resulting trust arises not from any presumed intention of the settlor, but as an automatic legal consequence of the circumstances. For example, where an express trust fails, or where there is a surplus of funds or assets after the termination of a trust. In such cases, the law presumes that the residual beneficial interest is held on resulting trust for the creator of the trust, not because that was his expressed intention, but because the law imposes this outcome automatically.
Both types of resulting trust are concerned, in their different ways, with ensuring that property does not vest beneficially in a person who gave no consideration and for whom no gift was intended.
When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him to a trustee.[13] However, Lord Denning, M. R. made it clear in Hussey v. Palmer[14] that they both run together; a resulting or implied trust and constructive trust are trusts imposed by law whenever justice and good conscience require it, and they are applied in the cases where the Defendant cannot conscientiously keep the property for himself alone.[15]
DOCTRINE OF PRESUMPTION OF ADVANCEMENT
The Doctrine of Presumption is a well-established principle in the English common law, which operates as an exception and as a rebuttal of the principle of resulting Trust. It provides that where a transfer of property is made by a person standing in a particular relationship to the recipient, the law presumes that the transfer was intended as a gift, rather than as a transaction giving rise to a trust. Unlike the doctrine of resulting trust, which focuses on contribution as the basis of beneficial ownership, the presumption of advancement focuses on the relationship between the parties as the basis for inferring a donative intent.[16]
The presumption of advancement arises where a person voluntarily transfers property to another with whom they stand in a relationship that the law regards as carrying an obligation of provision or support. In such cases, the law presumes a gift was intended, and no resulting trust will arise unless strong evidence is presented to rebut it.[17] The presumption of advancement operates only within some certain categories of relationships. In these instances, the law assumes that the transferor intended to make a gift, and therefore no resulting trust will arise unless strong evidence is presented to rebut it. These will be discussed below:
- Parents to Child (or Person Standing In Loco Parentis)
This is the most common and traditional category; where a parent or someone standing in Loco Parentis on behalf of a person, purchases a property in the name of the child, equity presumes that he intended to benefit the child outright.[18]
- Husband to Wife
A husband who transfers or purchases property in the name of his wife is presumed to be advancing her interests. This flows from the traditional duty of the husband to maintain and provide for his wife. Accordingly, the wife becomes the beneficial owner unless a contrary intention is proved.[19]
- Fiancé to Fiancée
Some authorities extend the presumption to gifts or transfers made by a man to his fiancée in contemplation of marriage. Although weaker than the husband-to-wife category, courts recognise that the engagement relationship carries expectations of provision, thereby supporting advancement.[20]
- Transfers for the Maintenance, Education, or Advancement of a Child
Where a parent transfers money or property specifically for the education, upkeep, or development of a child, the courts treat the act as advancement. The transfer is presumed to be for the child’s welfare, eliminating the possibility of a resulting trust.[21]
INSTANCES WHERE THE PRESUMPTION OF ADVANCEMENT WILL NOT ARISE
- Mother to Child
Historically, English common law did not regard a mother as standing in the same position as a father for purposes of advancement. Therefore, a transfer by a mother to her child does not automatically trigger the presumption, and a resulting trust will generally arise unless a gift is proved.[22]
- Wife to Husband
A wife transferring property to her husband is not presumed to intend a gift. In such cases, the courts tend to infer a resulting trust unless there is evidence showing a clear donative intention.[23]
- Transfers Between Siblings or Extended Relatives
Relationships such as brother-to-brother, uncle-to-nephew, cousin-to-cousin, and similar extended family ties do not attract the presumption. A transfer between such persons raises a resulting trust unless the intention to gift is demonstrated.[24]
- Commercial or Business Transfers
Where the transaction is driven by business convenience, investment, or commercial arrangements, courts do not infer advancement. There must be clear evidence of a gift; otherwise, the general doctrine of resulting trust applies.[25]
- Transfers Between Friends or Unrelated Persons
Where parties are connected by friendship or general goodwill, the presumption of advancement does not apply. A resulting trust will arise unless the transferor positively intended to make a gift.[26]
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF ADVANCEMENT
The presumption of advancement may be rebutted by evidence showing that the transferor did not intend to gift, notwithstanding the relationship between the parties. Such evidence must be contemporaneous with the transaction, or at least consistent with the intentions of the parties at the time of the transfer. A subsequent change of mind will not suffice. In Tinker v. Tinker,,[27] the English Court of Appeal held that a husband who transferred property to his wife to protect it from business creditors could not later reclaim it on the ground that no gift had been intended having represented the contrary, he was bound by that representation.
Nigerian courts have similarly held that the rebuttal of the presumption of advancement requires cogent and credible evidence.[28] Mere assertions by a transferor that no gift was intended will not be sufficient where the surrounding circumstances point to a contrary conclusion.
THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER DOCTRINE AND THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS
A central challenge presented by the doctrine of resulting trust in the matrimonial property context arises when a titled spouse who holds property on trust for a contributing spouse purports to transfer that property to a third-party purchaser. The question then becomes whether the beneficial owner’s equitable interest survives the transfer and remains enforceable against the purchaser.
The answer depends on whether the purchaser qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, sometimes called “equity’s darling.” Such a purchaser, who acquires legal title in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of any prior equitable interest, takes the property free of that interest. The equitable interest of the beneficiary is extinguished as against that purchaser, and their remedy lies only against the original trustee personally. This follows the equitable doctrine that says “where the equities are equal the law prevails” that is, if two competing interests are equal in the eye of equity, then the legal interest takes priority over the equitable interest. The holder of the legal estate may assert priority where he can prove himself to be a bona fide purchaser for value without any notice.[29]
Notice in this context is classified into three categories: actual notice, which is what the purchaser personally knew; constructive notice; what the purchaser would have discovered through the inquiries that a reasonable and prudent purchaser would have made; and imputed notice, the knowledge of the purchaser’s solicitor or agent, which is attributed to the purchaser. Due diligence in Nigerian property transactions must include physical inspection, inquiry into occupation, and examination of original documents. A purchaser who takes shortcuts does so at their peril.
IS THE RESULTING TRUST STILL ADEQUATE?
The Strengths of the Doctrine
The resulting trust doctrine has served Nigerian law admirably in filling the statutory vacuum left by the absence of a matrimonial property regime. It is principled, flexible, and grounded in centuries of equity jurisprudence. It prevents legal title from being used as an instrument of injustice and, as in the case of Jolugbo v. Aina,[30], it illustrates the capability of protecting proprietary interests even where the title documents state the contrary.
THE LIMITATIONS
The doctrine has serious limitations in the matrimonial context. First, it privileges financial contribution over other forms of contribution. A wife who stayed home, managed the household, raised children, and thereby freed her husband to earn the income that paid for the property may find herself unable to assert any beneficial interest under the resulting trust doctrine. Her contributions, though equally real and valuable, are not reflected in the form that the doctrine recognizes.
Secondly, the evidential burden placed on the contributing spouse is onerous. The requirement to prove financial contribution by evidence that is specific, direct, and referable to the property in question can be extremely difficult to satisfy in practice, particularly where contributions were made informally and without documentation.
Lastly, as the facts of Jolugbo v. Aina grimly illustrate, litigation under the resulting trust doctrine can span an entire lifetime. The original suits were filed in 1994 and 1997. The Supreme Court delivered its final ruling in 2025, which is more than thirty years later. By that time, both original parties were dead, and their children were litigating on behalf of their estates. Such delays deprive the doctrine of much of its practical utility.
THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The limitations of the resulting trust doctrine in the matrimonial property context make a compelling case for legislative reforms. Nigeria requires a Matrimonial Property Act that clearly defines the proprietary rights of spouses in property acquired during marriage, one that recognizes both financial and non-financial contributions, vests beneficial interests automatically without the need for litigation, and provides clear rules for the division of property upon dissolution of marriage. Nigeria’s legislative inaction in this area is conspicuous and increasingly difficult to justify. The resulting trust, though a powerful equitable tool, was never designed to be the primary vehicle for the resolution of matrimonial property disputes. It is a gap-filler, and the gap it fills grows wider with every year that passes without reform.
THE GENDER AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
The resulting trust doctrine’s exclusive focus on financial contribution raises a constitutional dimension that Nigerian courts have not yet fully confronted. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex.[31] Where the systematic application of the resulting trust doctrine produces outcomes that disproportionately disadvantage women by ignoring the domestic and non-financial labour that social structures predominantly assign to wives, there is at a minimum a serious question as to whether the doctrine’s application is compatible with constitutional equality guarantees.
The resulting trust doctrine’s privileging of monetary contribution reflects and reinforces a patriarchal valuation of economic activity over domestic care. In a society where wives disproportionately bear the burden of housework, childcare, and familial support, thereby enabling their husbands to accumulate property, a doctrine that looks exclusively to financial contribution to determine beneficial ownership will systematically produce outcomes unfavourable to women. This structural bias is not incidental; it is inherent in the design of the doctrine as received.
Nigerian courts have begun, in isolated decisions, to acknowledge the relevance of non-financial contributions to property disputes.[32] However, without statutory authority to give effect to such contributions, courts are constrained to use them only as evidence of a common intention, rather than as an independent basis for beneficial ownership.
CONCLUSION
Jolugbo v. Aina & Anor (2025)[33] is a significant decision that reaffirms the vitality of the resulting trust doctrine in Nigerian matrimonial property law. It confirms that a wife who funds the acquisition of property registered in her husband’s name holds a beneficial interest in that property that is enforceable against both the husband and third-party purchasers who fail to conduct proper due diligence. It reiterates the asymmetry between the presumption of resulting trust, which arises where a wife pays for property in the husband’s name and the presumption of advancement, which does not arise in that direction. And it sets clear limits on the bona fide purchaser doctrine, demanding a genuine and thorough standard of pre-purchase inquiry. However, this decision also exposes the profound inadequacy of a legal system that leaves the resolution of matrimonial property disputes entirely to equitable doctrines. The resulting trust doctrine does equity’s best work within its inherent limitations, but those limitations are real, and they fall disproportionately on women whose contributions to family property are non-monetary or informal. A gender-sensitive approach to matrimonial property law would require, at a minimum, that courts engage explicitly with the social context in which property acquisition takes place within marriage. It would ask not merely who paid for the property, but who made it possible for the payment to be made, recognising that the labour of household management and childcare is an economic contribution even if it does not take the form of money. The continuing dominance of resulting trust in Nigerian matrimonial property disputes is not a triumph of equitable principle. It is a symptom of legislative failure. Until Nigeria enacts a comprehensive statutory framework for matrimonial property, the courts will continue to do what the legislature should have done, imperfectly, belatedly, and at enormous cost to the parties who appear before them.
Footnotes
[1] Mercy Ogheneruemu Inone and MO Omozue, ‘An Appraisal of the Ancillary Reliefs in Dissolution of Marriages Contracted Under the Marriage Act’ (2026) 14(1) Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 82.
[2] (2025) LPELR-811175(SC).
[3] (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 899) 300 SC
[4] 2 Cox Eq Cas 92, [1775-1802] All ER Rep 205, (1788) 2 RR 14, 30 ER 42, [1788] EWHC Exch J8
[5] Supra
[6] Ibekwe v.Nwosu (2011) LPELR-1391(SC) (Pp. 5 -6 Paras F -B); (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1251) 1
[7] Huebner v. Aeronautical Industrial Engineering & Project Management Co. Ltd (2017) LPELR-42078(SC) (Pp 11 -12 paras.E – A); (2017) 14 NWLR (P)t. 1586) 397
[8] Black’s Law Dictionary, Page 1513.”
[9] International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, Vol. 6 Issue 2 (2023), pp. 2345 – 2352. DOI: 10.10000/IJLMH.114695. Published under the aegis of VidhiAagaz – Inking Your Brain. Available at: view link accessed 27th January 2026.
[10] Waters, D. W. M., The Doctrine of Resulting Trusts in Common Law Canada, 16 McGill L.J. (1970) 189.
[11] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1083) 296
[12] [1974] EWCA Civ 7, [1974] Ch 269
[13] Anyaegbunam V. Osoka (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 449
[14] (1972) 3 All ER 744 at 747
[15] (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 449
[16] Jamie Glister, ‘Is There a Presumption of Advancement?’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 39, 47 view link accessed 2nd May 2026
[17] Nwankwo & Anor V. Nwankwo (2017) LPELR-42832(CA)
[18] Ughutevbe v. Shonowo (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 899) 300 SC
[19] Moate v Moate [1948] 2 All ER 486.
[20] Supra
[21] Shephard v Cartwright [1954] 3 WLR 967; [1955] AC 431.
[22] Bennet v Bennet (1879) 10 Ch. D. 474,
[23] Abrahams v Trustee in Bankruptcy of Abrahams [2000] WTLR 593
[24] Eleanor Harris, ‘It’s not mine, it’s his’: a quick sprint through trusts view link accessed 2nd May 2026
[25] Will Chen, ‘Presumed Resulting Trust’ (LawProf) view link accessed 8 May 2026
[26] Westdeutsche Landebank v Islington LBC [1996]
[27] [1970] 2 WLR 331; [1970] P 136.
[28] Ughutevbe v. Shonowo (2004) LPELR-3317(SC)
[29] Pilcher v Rawlins, (1872) LR 7 Ch. App. 259
[30] Supra
[31] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 s 42(1)
[32] Lehi Attorneys, Settlement of Property in Matrimonial Proceedings: Proving Non-Financial Contributions in Light of Aguolu v. Aguolu, available at: View link (accessed 20th February 2026).
[33] Supra
AUTHORS